Iran's army says its military doctrine is shifting from defensive to offensive
Iran's army spokesman said its doctrine has turned offensive, promising faster, wider and possibly preemptive retaliation.
Objective Facts
Brig. Gen. Mohammad Akraminia, spokesman for Iran's regular army, told IRNA on Aug. 22 that Iran's military doctrine had shifted from defensive to offensive, and said the change took shape during what he called the 12-day and 40-day wars. He said Iran would respond to any attack immediately and with greater force, while Shafaq News and RBC quoted him saying the new doctrine does not in itself mean preemptive strikes. In the same remarks he restated a reward of about 5 billion tomans for killing or capturing US troops who enter Iran, and said US influence in the region had fallen. On Aug. 26 he told Iranian media that preemption is legal when proportionate and necessary, and listed energy hubs, the Bab al-Mandab Strait and undersea cables as possible targets in a future war, according to Critical Threats and Press TV. Iranian state media framed the shift as a legitimate gain from the war, while Iran International stressed the preemption language and signs of strain inside Iran's leadership.
Left-Leaning Perspective
Mainstream left-leaning US outlets did not run stand-alone coverage of the army's doctrine statement that could be found in this window. Searches of The New York Times, The Washington Post, CNN, NPR and Politico returned no articles on Akraminia's remarks, so this band has no position to report.
Right-Leaning Perspective
Right-leaning security analysts treated the statement as a real change worth tracking but also as messaging. The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute, writing with ISW on Aug. 26, broke Akraminia's later interview into four principles and judged that Iranian officials likely publicized them to coerce Washington and restore deterrence. JINSA's Aug. 24 war update took the remarks at face value as a plan to strike first and hit back harder, and noted his claim that Iran used lulls in fighting to rebuild.
Deep Dive
Brig. Gen. Mohammad Akraminia's Aug. 22 remarks put the regular army on record with a turn toward offense that Iran's leadership had been signaling for weeks. He said the change took shape during the 12-day war of June 2025 and the war that began in February 2026, and he tied it to faster and larger retaliation. He repeated a cash reward for killing or capturing US troops in a ground incursion, and said US standing in the region had fallen. Four days later, in an interview reported by Press TV, Iran International and CTP-ISW, he went further: he said preemption is lawful under international law when proportionate and necessary, and named energy hubs, the Bab al-Mandab Strait and undersea cables as possible targets. The main gap in the coverage is the preemption question. On Aug. 22 Shafaq News and RBC quoted him saying the doctrine does not in itself mean striking first, while Iran International led with the opposite reading, built on his description of the Jordan base strike as preemptive. His Aug. 26 interview leaned toward the second reading. CTP-ISW's view that the statements are partly meant to coerce Washington fits Iran's habit of public signaling, but it does not settle whether the army could carry out what Akraminia described; CTP-ISW itself said it could not confirm Iran used the multiple-strike approach in the last war. Iranian state outlets present the doctrine as settled and lawful, and leave out any discussion of cost or risk to Iran. The next tests are practical. One is whether Iranian forces act on the preemption language as US sanctions pressure grows and talks stall. Another is whether the regular army and the Revolutionary Guards describe the doctrine in the same terms, and whether Washington answers the bounty and doctrine claims directly. A third is whether threats against undersea cables and the Bab al-Mandab show up in Houthi activity or Iranian naval moves.
Regional Perspective
Iranian outlets carried the statement in very different keys. Press TV reported Akraminia's Aug. 26 remarks that the shift followed directives from the late Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the late Maj. Gen. Abdolrahim Mousavi, and that any enemy miscalculation would draw an immediate response that could widen the war to the Bab al-Mandab and a US base in Syria. Iran International ran the Aug. 22 remarks under a headline saying the doctrine allows preemptive strikes, and on Aug. 26 reported his Mehr interview promising new equipment, tactics and arenas. Outside Iran, Turkey's Yeni Safak, using Anadolu copy, led on the reward for killing or capturing US troops, and Russia's RBC, citing the Iranian daily Donya-e Eqtesad, stressed his caveat that offense does not necessarily mean preemption. The framing differs most on what surrounds the statement. Iran International placed it next to Pezeshkian saying it is better to end the war now while Iran is respected, and Ghalibaf warning that Iran cannot endure if people go hungry, which reads as a picture of a leadership split between hawkish signals and economic strain. Press TV gave no space to dissent or to US responses and described Iranian strikes as rapid and crushing answers to aggression. Yeni Safak and Anadolu also carried Akraminia's claim that a Saudi, Turkish and Pakistani security mechanism formed without Washington shows US influence slipping, a point Western-oriented outlets largely skipped. For Iran, the statement is meant to raise the price of any new US or Israeli attack while sanctions bite and talks stall. For Gulf and Red Sea states, Akraminia's list of energy hubs, undersea cables and the Bab al-Mandab puts their infrastructure on the map of a future war. For the United States, the bounty and the preemption language bear directly on troops based in Jordan, Syria and the Gulf.